From calls to reform climate finance to demands for equity and adaptation, experts say COP30 will be the real test of whether global cooperation can still deliver results
COP30 is upon us. Amid a global geopolitical churn, where climate has slipped down the priority list, the world will head to Belém, Brazil, for what the COP30 Presidency has called the “Implementation COP”. Last year, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) grappled with questions regarding the relevance of the annual climate summit. This year, with the Amazon rainforest as the backdrop, the stakes are both symbolic and substantive.
In the run-up to COP30, CarbonCopy hosted a podcast series that featured six experts on climate finance, climate science and energy to understand what lies ahead at the climate summit that begins on November 10, and why the summit still holds relevance despite the political noise and scepticism that threaten to drown its significance.
The COP30 Presidency is clear on what their ultimate goal is — to save multilateralism. “We all know that we can only tackle climate in a multilateral way,” COP30 CEO Ana Toni told CarbonCopy. “And as there is so much tension in the geopolitics, we feel COP30 will be a key moment to strengthen climate multilateralism.”
Brazil’s presidency seems keen to steer the process away from the superficial “wins” that recent COPs have been in the news for toward what Toni calls “actions that make sense for real people.” The focus is on accelerating solutions already within reach, which include forest conservation and finance reform, and making them work for developing nations. These are lofty aims considering the US has turned its back on the climate crisis, with no other Global North countries stepping in to fill that void. Many vulnerable countries have also complained about the lack of sufficient funds to make it to Brazil or afford the pricey accommodation available on the UNFCCC official list.
All of this means COP30 will open under the weight of two parallel realities. A world increasingly divided and distracted, and a planet running out of time. Whether Belém can bridge that gap will determine not just the fate of this “Implementation COP”, but the credibility of the climate process itself.
What is on the agenda?
On top of the agenda is the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, which was announced at COP29. The plan aims to mobilise $1.3 trillion in climate finance annually by 2035. Last year, countries pledged $300 billion. All eyes are on the roadmap, likely to be released before COP begins, which is expected to outline the form of these funds and their disbursement.
Toni said the presidency is working with finance ministers, central banks, and multilateral institutions to ensure “real-time transparency and accountability” in how funds are mobilised and spent. “Reform of multilateral banks is absolutely vital,” she said. “We also need to make the climate funds more fit for purpose, more agile, more accessible, especially to least developed countries.”
Pepukaye Bardouille of the Bridgetown Initiative agrees, but warns that structure matters more than size. “The capital is there within the wider system,” she noted. “But does it have the right risk profile, pricing structure, or tenor? We need more, cheaper, longer-term financing — 40 to 50-year money for adaptation, not just 15-year loans.”
Adaptation needs to step out of mitigation’s shadow
So far, most COPs have revolved around mitigation, with negotiations largely centred around cutting emissions, setting targets and tracking progress. But developing countries, including India, are pushing for COP30 to shift that imbalance and focus more on adaptation. They argue that adaptation has long been neglected to the point that it has now become an immediate need for poorer nations already bearing the brunt of climate impacts.
“Adaptation must be placed on an equal footing with mitigation,” said Dr. Indu Murthy, sector head for Climate, Environment, and Sustainability at CSTEP. “That means measurable targets, predictable finance, and agreed metrics for tracking progress.” For Murthy, the real shift lies in how countries define adaptation. “It cannot be framed as a matter of finance alone,” she said. “It must be seen as a question of resilience-building, of development itself, and of justice.”
She argued that COP30 should focus on making the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which will be discussed at the summit, measurable and accountable. “The GGA is stuck on weak metrics, fragmented governance, and dilution of equity principles,” she said. “Developing countries like India need to push for stronger language on finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Unless equity is the central piece of the framework, we won’t get meaningful outcomes.”
Toni confirmed that the presidency shares that goal. “Adaptation is absolutely a priority for COP30,” she said. “We’ve seen the devastation from heatwaves, floods, and droughts. It’s time adaptation gets the attention it deserves. We hope to deliver a package of outcomes that makes adaptation a real part of both the negotiation and the action agenda.”
Energy transition amidst a geopolitical crossfire
The tectonic shift in the global energy landscape is already being felt. The return of the Trump administration has dynamically changed conversations around fossil fuels, renewables and questions of responsibility.
“The US wants to be the world’s largest exporter of natural gas,” said Vijaya Ramachandran, Director of Energy and Development at the Breakthrough Institute. “It’s moving away from renewable subsidies, and that will affect technology development. But this administration’s message to poor countries, that it will not impose its energy preferences, has been welcomed in Africa.”
Ramachandran put forth, what she called, a “contrarian view to most people”. “For the poorest countries, this is the right approach. Africa’s natural gas reserves must be exploited to meet industrial needs. You can’t build factories or fertiliser plants on intermittent renewables.”
Her broader critique, however, highlights the imbalance in the global system. “Rich countries have not found a viable decarbonisation path for poor countries,” she said. “They’re demanding rapid fossil fuel phaseouts without providing the money or technology to make that transition. That’s not a viable proposition.”
Ramachandran sees one potential area of opportunity amid the turbulence — nuclear energy. “India is a very attractive market for small modular reactors,” she said. “It has the regulatory capacity and technical know-how. We could see major collaboration with the US on adapting new nuclear technologies for developing markets.”
What will India’s role be?
At COP29, India vociferously rejected the $300 billion climate finance outcome during the closing plenary session. For some, it was India positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. For others, it was too little, too late. Sharpening this Global South leadership role will be key for India at COP30, say experts. But it will be a balancing act between solidarity with the Global South and the responsibility that comes with being a major economy.
“We are now in a position where smaller developing countries are turning to emerging economies like India,” said former diplomat and Indian climate negotiator Manjeev Singh Puri. “They’re saying, you too must act, not just demand money and adaptation support. So India must lead, but also defend its development space.”
He sees India’s consistency as an advantage. “We were called a naysayer in Paris, but we were the yes-sayer. We set up the International Solar Alliance, we announced net zero by 2070, and we’re the only G20 country on track to meet and exceed our NDCs,” he said. “Green leadership is embedded for us because it’s in our own interest.”
Vaibhav Chaturvedi, Senior Fellow at the Council of Energy, Environment and Water at Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW) added that India’s next Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) — the “NDC 3.0” — will be watched closely. “Whatever India puts forward becomes a signal for policymakers, investors, and industry,” he said. “If we align our NDC with the 2070 net zero goal, that keeps our credibility strong.”
Keeping the process alive
The political tension surrounding the US has added as some may call it an unnecessary layer of complexity for the COP presidency. Puri warned that Washington’s role at COP30 could again be disruptive rather than constructive. “The United States by itself has great abilities to act as a major disruptor, and that’s something we must understand,” he said. “At this juncture, even the Europeans, who were once the strongest climate champions, seem less willing to do much. The push now is on emerging countries to pitch in, which turns the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities on its head.”
Puri sees this as a defining tension of Belém. “We can’t tackle a crisis of this scale bilaterally or unilaterally,” he said. “The process must stay alive, but the US approach makes that harder.”
Bardouille seemed a bit more positive in her outlook. “We can’t just shout that the system must change. We have to co-create that change, through trust, collaboration, and practical reforms that make finance actually work.”
If COP29 was about setting a climate finance number, COP30 will be about proving that systems can deliver. As Ana Toni put it, “We cannot just stand still and wait for public money to come.”
For India, the stakes are particularly high as it positions itself as a bridge between two increasingly fragmented worlds. “We are today the fifth-largest economy, soon to be the fourth. We are a country of consequence. India may not be able to solve global problems alone, but global problems can’t be solved without India,” said Puri.
What we need to see at COP30 is not another round of promises, but proof that the world can still come together and act collectively to fight the climate crisis.
Creatives: Riddhi Tandon
The $300 Billion Question Ahead of COP30
The climate finance target set at COP29 highlights ambition, but bridging the gap demands political leadership and structural innovation, not just funding pledges, writes Labanya Prakash Jena
$2.3 to $2.5 trillion – this is the amount of capital Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs), excluding China, need per annum to meet their climate goals, according to the Independent High Level Expert Group (IHLEG). By 2035, that figure will climb to $3.2 trillion annually, with $1.3 trillion expected from international sources. But the reality is sobering. By 2023, EMDCs mobilised only $196 billion in 2023, as per the latest study by Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). To stay on track, they’ll need to increase their capital mobilisation elevenfold. Here, financial support from developed countries — politically known as climate finance — can bridge the financing gaps. But it needs political willingness, reform of multilateral institutions, a change in form and types of financing, and removal of institutional bottlenecks.
From targets to delivery
Over the years, climate finance has been getting increasing attention at intergovernmental platforms, particularly at the annual Conference of the Parties (COP). Last year’s COP29, dubbed the “Finance COP”, was where the climate finance target increased from $100 billion per year, applicable until 2025, to $300 billion by 2035. Although the incremental number is attractive on paper, it is far from adequate to meet the funding needs of EMDCs.
Moreover, there are no concrete plans for how to mobilise these, who will provide how much, and what kinds of finance.
Developed countries committed to provide $100 billion of climate finance by 2020 in 2009, but it took them 13 years to fulfil commitments, even if we assume that climate finance is a tangible support to developing countries. The upcoming COP30 in Belem, Brazil, must lay down a pathway and a concrete roadmap with a firm commitment by developed countries to provide support within a defined timeline.
The quality problem
For a long time, developing countries have complained about the quality of climate finance. India complained several times that private climate finance, even if attributed to public climate finance, cannot be considered as support. There is no clarity on how public finance is really used to drive private finance. A major source of distrust is the opaque reporting by OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, which rely on voluntary submissions with little verification. Also, loans and equity, often at a market rate, are also considered as climate finance, which are contested by developing countries. Here, the important point is how much of this $300 billion will be really concession capital and how much private capital will be market-determined.
In addition, how much of them is in the form of loans, which will further increase the debt of EMDCs. Even if it is concessional debt, it will increase the debt of countries, consequently affecting their credit profiles, which are not in their best interest of EMDCs. It is recognised at various global forums that the debt burden of several EMDCs is not sustainable, and a significant portion of debt must be forgiven or delayed, providing additional headroom to them to invest in climate actions and meet public needs of other developmental priorities, such as education and healthcare. This is why debt relief must become a part of the climate agenda. Financial instruments such as Debt-for-Climate (DFC), that substitute climate actions for debt restructuring, can be implemented. Debt restructuring can be based on efforts to reduce carbon emissions and restore natural capital — both are global public goods and also provide much-needed debt relief to EMDCs.
Reforming the system
Institutional bottlenecks are another drag. Bureaucratic hurdles to approve and disburse climate finance in multilateral financial institutions, and a lack of risk-taking ability and willingness of these institutions, stifle climate flows. Institutional innovation and removing unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles is crucial.. Another major challenge is the lack of integration among various institutions that provide climate finance; their operational boundaries and institutional processes of selection, approval, and disbursement are different. These differences create inefficiency in climate finance mobilisation and disbursement. The Finance for Development (FfD4) draft calls for greater integration among existing mechanisms on climate finance.
Adaptation: The neglected half
Historically, climate mitigation projects have received a large chunk of climate finance due to their inherent clear business model and financial viability in several segments. But climate adaptation, which is equally important and more urgent for EMDCs, is not getting its due share of climate finance.
As per the last report of CPI, climate adaptation finance received only 2.4% of total climate finance in FY2023, i.e. $46 billion, compared to the requirements of $222 billion per year over 2024-2030. Here, long-term financial programs such as the International Monetary Fund’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) can provide long-term concessional capital.
Investment in resilience doesn’t just protect lives and infrastructure, it also safeguards a country’s debt servicing capacity. In addition, suspending debt servicing during a climate disaster will allow EMDCs to spend on rehabilitation, which will enable them to recover from economic downturn quickly.
Making capital affordable
For most developing economies, the terms of capital, particularly the cost of capital, remains a major barrier. It is more problematic for economies importing capital for climate actions as they face currency risk, which further increases the cost of capital.
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) can offer concessional financial solutions to reduce the cost of capital (e.g. subsidised credit guarantee, currency hedging, equity), and regional development banks (e.g. AIIB) can also offer these financial solutions. As MDBs climate finance support is not effective and adequate, and international climate finance support is far from required, EMDCs can collectively bargain for better from these global institutions. The bargaining points must focus on more grants for extremely vulnerable countries, interest-free or concessional loans, flexibility in loan terms and conditions (e.g. financial support for local governments without sovereign guarantee), and more risky capital at a lower rate (e.g. subsidised credit guarantee fee, equity capital).
The bottom line
The recent withdrawal of the United States from international climate agreements, trade barriers, and war in the Middle East and Europe are transitory hurdles to global efforts on climate change. Climate finance is essential for EMDCs, and developed countries committed to climate actions must increase their support many times to meet global needs and ambitions to limit global warming within the desired level. Besides, there is a dire need for institutional innovation in multilateral institutions that can enable bridging EMDCs’ green funding gaps.
Labanya Prakash Jena is Director at Climate and Sustainability Initiative (CSI), and Advisor at Climate Trends. Views expressed are personal
Creatives: Riddhi Tandon
Mapping the road to $1.3 trillion at COP30
Developing countries, excluding China, account for less than 15% of global climate finance flows. Enhancing flows to these countries will drive the next wave of global energy and material demand
The leadership of the upcoming COP30, being hosted in Brazil, has signalled that implementation will be the mantra of COP30 to advance the multilateral climate agenda which has emerged over a decade of negotiations. At its core lies a critical and overdue task: delivering on the high-level climate finance commitments for developing countries, as agreed at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan. To this end, the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T was launched as a work programme that will identify various levers to deliver $1.3 trillion per year in international climate finance to developing countries by 2035.
According to the World Bank, developing countries, excluding China, which represent a quarter of global GDP, account for less than 15% of global climate finance flows. Enhancing flows to these countries will drive the next wave of global energy and material demand as they pursue development. This is critical for the success of global climate action. Developing countries also host some of the most renewable energy resource rich sites in the world, which can generate low-cost clean energy if investment risks are mitigated.
Yet the ability of developing countries to mobilise finance for climate action remains severely constrained. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on interest on sovereign debt than on either education or health. Servicing such elevated levels of sovereign debt limits fiscal space for developmental expenditure, including on climate action. Smaller domestic financial systems (as a percentage of GDP) and higher costs of capital in these countries further limit their ability to meet investment requirements by themselves.
Creating healthier economic environments
Over and above domestic constraints, shifting global priorities have fueled uncertainty regarding international climate finance. This year, key developed countries announced plans to review multilateral commitments and slash foreign aid budgets. These developments have only compounded concerns of developing countries, adding to those pertaining to the quantum and quality of climate finance historically delivered. Therefore, a credible Roadmap becomes critical to dispel uncertainty over the availability of external climate finance for developing countries. Based on analysis from the latest study by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), here are six steps to enhance climate finance for developing countries:
First, foster enabling investment environments in developing countries to attract capital flows. One step in this direction is putting in place policies for transition in key sectors such as power, transport, and industry that address sector-specific bottlenecks in the flow of capital. This should be complemented by cross-cutting policies such as taxonomies and disclosures that link capital with credible investment opportunities.
Further, domestic financial regulators should accelerate the greening of their financial systems by pricing climate risk considerations into capital flows (e.g., lower regulatory capital requirements for holding green assets). Peer-to-peer learning could also play a key role. Emerging economies that lead in climate action could set up centres of excellence to facilitate capacity building for policymakers and regulators from other countries.
Second, free up fiscal space in developing countries and optimise public expenditure towards the sustainable development goals (SDGs), including climate action. Levers such as debt-for-climate swaps, sovereign debt refinancing on preferential terms and debt restructuring with principal reductions may be applied on a case-by-case basis, to create fiscal headroom.
Immediate debt relief should be complemented by measures that address underlying structural problems (e.g., through IMF supported programs under its Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or the Resilience and Sustainability Trust) to prevent another cycle of unsustainable debt. Once fiscal space is created, SDG-aligned budgeting could help direct capital flows towards development, including mechanisms to support climate finance flows.
South-South outlook
Third, leverage South-South cooperation, particularly through South-led multilateralism. Emerging international finance hubs in developing countries like India’s Gujarat International Finance Tec-City International Financial Services Centre (GIFT-IFSC), Rwanda’s Kigali hub, or Vietnam’s upcoming centres should be developed as conduits of capital to the Global South. This can serve countries beyond their immediate jurisdictions. Regional development banks, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Asia, could anchor green banks in these international finance hubs. These banks can help create viable investment pipelines by offering project preparation services, aggregating and de-risking project portfolios.
Investable project pipelines could also facilitate investment from one developing country into another’s markets. Cross-investment in each other’s sustainable bond markets and expanding sustainable bond issuances in local currencies, as proposed by the BRICS countries, should also be considered.
Fourth, for climate adaptation, scale international public capital, preferably on concessional terms, across developing countries. Current international climate finance flows are heavily skewed towards mitigation. That must change. Public capital should increasingly target climate adaptation, including through mechanisms that offer climate risk insurance. Examples include those pooling risks to lower costs such as CEEW’s proposed Global Resilience Reserve Fund (GRRF), funded by Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This will ensure affordable, effective insurance solutions that shield developing countries from worsening climate impacts.
Fifth, international capital for climate mitigation should be deployed in a targeted manner for maximum impact. Offering protection against risks in developing countries at the intersection of high energy requirements and high clean energy potential could advance global decarbonisation at low costs. Utilising multilateral development finance institutions’ (DFI) callable capital, largely untapped thus far, could bolster capacities of these institutions to undertake such endeavours.
Clean energy thus produced beyond host country requirements may be exported through mechanisms such as India’s One Sun One World One Grid initiative, now also endorsed by International Solar Alliance member countries. This would generate revenues for host countries and help buyer countries advance their climate objectives. Finally, capital may also be drawn in from innovative sources such as carbon markets, solidarity levies, and the voluntary rechannelling of SDRs by developed countries.
Sixth, bolster DFI capabilities to deliver finance at all levels – domestic, bilateral and multilateral. Domestic DFIs in developing countries are best placed to understand local financing opportunities and bottlenecks and can help develop investable project pipelines. Reforming multilateral DFIs requires political will from sovereign shareholders to act on recommendations from the Indian and Brazilian G20 presidencies, such as balance sheet optimisation, recapitalisation, and SDR rechanneling.
As a complementary measure, MDBs should institutionalise private capital mobilisation through ring-fenced funds that are funded by private capital and managed by MDBs. Such structures would offer private investors the benefits of MDB project selection, governance and quality assurance. All this, while facilitating greater capital flows without expanding MDB balance sheets.
Implementing this six-point framework requires actions by developing countries themselves, those that leverage South-South cooperation, as well as support from the Global North. Presciently, the COP30 Presidency has called for mutirão, or collective global effort to combat climate action. Here’s hoping the Presidency’s call does not go in vain.
Arjun Dutt is a Senior Programme Lead at the Council on Energy, Environment and Water. Views are personal.
India stands at a crossroads — resist new carbon rules or reshape them to reflect equity and development. Photo: Riddhi Tandon
India at COP30: From Rule-Taker to Rule-Maker in the Climate-Trade Era
As Brazil pushes for a global forum linking climate and trade, India stands at a crossroads — resist new carbon rules or reshape them to reflect equity and development
The Brazilian COP30 presidency’s push to institutionalise an Integrated Forum on Climate and Trade marks a turning point in international climate diplomacy. This also brings India at a historic crossroads.
The emerging coalition of global powers—the European Union, China, and Brazil—signals an irreversible move toward unified global carbon pricing systems closely linked to trade regulations like the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). This architecture promises potent climate action. It also underscores the urgent need for India to assert its voice, interests, and values within this new multilateral ecosystem.
The COP30 presidency letters have placed trade and carbon markets explicitly as “enablers and accelerators” of climate progress, and are rightly pushing for a global dialogue to break ideological silos and align international market mechanisms. This COP30 forum that’s being launched with World Trade Organisation (WTO) and United Nations (UN) support can help harmonise standards and expand national emissions trading systems to scale decarbonisation.
According to the recent Harvard-MIT Global Climate Policy Project report, coherent international carbon pricing coalitions can cut global emissions sevenfold and generate nearly $200 billion a year in climate finance. But such coalitions also need to drive just and equitable transitions.
Finding a seat at the table
For India, this integration is an important moment, given our reservations on global climate trade moves. On one hand, inclusion in Brazil’s coalition and the COP30 forum presents a strategic opportunity to shape global standard-setting in ways that protect the country’s development priorities. India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) can be positioned as a credible and compatible component of the global carbon market architecture, helping Indian exports avoid duplicative carbon pricing under CBAM.
And India can advocate within the coalition to embed differentiated responsibilities, demand transitional flexibilities and secure targeted climate finance. This can help technology transfer and capacity-building — both key to ensuring honest burden-sharing. Basically, we can be at the table to fine tune standards, currently being shaped by only one set of nations.
However, caution is also imperative. The EU and the G7 countries, historically masters of trade and climate governance, have been criticised for bringing legacies of often self-serving policies, masked behind noble-sounding principles.
In the past, carbon offset schemes under the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement have been called out for enabling rich nations to delay domestic cuts, often through projects lacking credibility. Environmental standards in G7/EU trade deals were similarly criticised for functioning as non-tariff barriers, while climate finance is frequently tied to donor-country firms and laden with debt. Even fossil fuel subsidy reforms have historically been uneven — G7 nations move slowly, while pressuring poorer countries to phase out support without viable alternatives.
The EU’s CBAM is currently under scrutiny from the Global South, as it risks becoming a protectionist barrier disguised as environmental stewardship, unfairly penalising economies whose developmental emissions follow a just growth trajectory. Across mechanisms, global climate governance is increasingly being criticised for pushing costs and constraints onto the Global South, while seemingly preserving advantages for developed economies in the name of sustainability.
Without robust safeguards, these policies risk constraining India’s industrialisation, raising compliance costs, fragmenting markets, and deepening inequities both across countries and within Indian society.
Building strong South-South alliances
Brazil’s leadership in integrating climate and trade at COP30 can drive meaningful change — but only if India builds strong alliances with like-minded Global South nations. Such alliances can challenge dominant Northern narratives to insist that trade-linked climate policies don’t throttle development but help equitable transitions. This means demanding clear rules, fair decision-making, and using the money earned from carbon markets to help the most vulnerable people and industries.
India will also need to speed up and deepen its domestic carbon market reforms and ensure robust Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems and broaden its sectoral coverage with transparency and inclusivity, according to experts. Building a credible, inclusive carbon market that supports sustainable growth without sacrificing social equity is as important as the urgency of putting in place systems ideally within the next two to three years, research shows.
This institutional readiness is not merely compliance — it will signal India’s capacity to lead global climate governance. And will strengthen India’s position to negotiate with credibility apart from helping to transform risks posed by CBAM into opportunities to create jobs and sustainable growth.
India’s first emission intensity targets for carbon-intensive sectors like steel, cement, and power mark a major step toward credible, market-based climate action that’s aligned with global standards.
In this transitional moment at COP30, India cannot afford to be a passive observer or mere rule-taker. Through skilled diplomacy, coalition-building, and pioneering domestic reforms, India can help build a global climate-trade regime that respects the country’s ecology and developmental realities.
This is a pivotal moment for India to shift its stance from defending against policies like CBAM to actively shaping the global climate-trade agenda. India’s ability to influence rules on carbon pricing, market transparency, and trade barriers will decide whether these emerging tools open opportunities or create new exclusions.
